Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data. AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.
Affected products
Version statuses are supplied by the assigning organization. Consult the original record for detailed ranges and platform conditions.
ash-project ash_phoenix
Default version status: unaffected
0.6.0-rc.1 to < 2.3.25affected
pkg:hex/ash_phoenixash-project ash_phoenix
Default version status: unaffected
06875682999938f607c970e71b6a80af90e18b3d to < a3691a3cb0947e8f2dc2c3cbff138a3e6197a15baffected
pkg:github/ash-project/ash_phoenix