CVE-2026-80218

Description

Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Affected products

Version statuses are supplied by the assigning organization. Consult the original record for detailed ranges and platform conditions.

References

• https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp ↗
• https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-80218.html ↗
• https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-80218 ↗
• https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269 ↗
• https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/2640e1872e1fef4e4606e601bf00102cff784c03 ↗
• https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7baac243ca651eee127a84d672eee3fcff42e598 ↗