CVE-2026-58202

Description

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.

Affected products

Version statuses are supplied by the assigning organization. Consult the original record for detailed ranges and platform conditions.

References

• https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m ↗
• https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819 ↗
• https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0 ↗