Description
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it. Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject. This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
Affected products
Version statuses are supplied by the assigning organization. Consult the original record for detailed ranges and platform conditions.
dropbox samly
Default version status: unaffected
0.3.0 to < *affected
pkg:hex/samlydropbox samly
Default version status: unaffected
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c to < *affected
pkg:github/dropbox/samlyhandnot2 samly
Default version status: unaffected
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c to < *affected
pkg:github/handnot2/samly