Description
CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.
Affected products
Version statuses are supplied by the assigning organization. Consult the original record for detailed ranges and platform conditions.
CCC-Attestation attested-tls-poc
Default version status: unaffected
0 to ≤ 731ca82ed533fc7a1092be980887ae2e34261da2affected
pkg:github/ccc-attestation/attested-tls-pocReferences
- https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/pull/58 ↗
- https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/tree/5b6c5374b3fe8b671906c8ab32f6134d9c3da26d/relay-attacks-formal ↗
- https://github.com/ionut-arm/mbedtls/blob/f4ac7593826a506fc509c83cad73786acab1d442/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c#L430-L436 ↗
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-intra-handshake-fail/ ↗
- https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail ↗
- https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc ↗
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ccc-attestation-sig-attested-tls-poc-through-commit-731ca82-attestation-relay-attack ↗