Description
Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR secure pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 2.1 through 5.2 may permit a nearby man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing (in the Passkey authentication procedure) by reflection of the public key and the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. The attack methodology determines the Passkey value one bit at a time.
Affected products
Version statuses are supplied by the assigning organization. Consult the original record for detailed ranges and platform conditions.
n/a n/a
n/aaffected
References
- https://www.bluetooth.com/learn-about-bluetooth/key-attributes/bluetooth-security/reporting-security/ ↗
- https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/799380 ↗
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/NSS6CTGE4UGTJLCOZOASDR3T3SLL6QJZ/ ↗
- https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00520.html ↗
- https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00517.html ↗
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00020.html ↗
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00019.html ↗
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00022.html ↗
- https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4951 ↗
- https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202209-16 ↗
- https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/799380 ↗