Description
The signature verification routine in Enigmail before 2.0.7 interprets user ids as status/control messages and does not correctly keep track of the status of multiple signatures, which allows remote attackers to spoof arbitrary email signatures via public keys containing crafted primary user ids.
Affected products
Version statuses are supplied by the assigning organization. Consult the original record for detailed ranges and platform conditions.
n/a n/a
n/aaffected
References
- http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2018/06/13/10 ↗
- https://www.enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/changelog ↗
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/04/30/4 ↗
- http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Apr/38 ↗
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152703/Johnny-You-Are-Fired.html ↗
- https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired ↗
- https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired/blob/master/paper/johnny-fired.pdf ↗