{"id":"CVE-2026-99016","state":"PUBLISHED","title":"riscv: futex: untag the user pointer before the atomic access","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv: futex: untag the user pointer before the atomic access\n\naccess_ok() checks untagged_addr(uaddr), but arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser()\nand futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() hand the raw uaddr to the inline asm\namoswap/amoadd/.../lr.w+sc.w through the \"+m\" (*uaddr) operand.  When the\ntagged address ABI is enabled (CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SUPM, prctl\nPR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL with PMLEN != 0), those two addresses differ: a\nuser pointer whose top PMLEN bits hold a tag passes access_ok() after\nuntagging, but the atomic is then performed on the still-tagged raw\naddress.\n\nSupervisor-mode data accesses are not subject to the U-mode pointer\nmasking (that is governed by menvcfg.PMM, which the kernel does not set),\nso hardware does not strip the tag for the kernel's own access.  With\nSv57 and PMLEN=16 the tag bits overlap the canonical-address bits, so a\ntagged pointer can name a canonical kernel virtual address (e.g. in the\nlinear map) whose untagged form is a valid user address.  An unprivileged\nprocess can thus make FUTEX_WAKE_OP perform an atomic read-modify-write on\nan arbitrary kernel address, with the matching FUTEX_OP_CMP_* result\nserving as a read oracle.\n\nget_user()/put_user()/raw_copy_{to,from}_user() already untag the pointer\nafter the access_ok() check; do the same in the futex helpers so the\natomic operates on the address that was actually validated.","publishedAt":"2026-10-23T12:20:47.859Z","updatedAt":"2026-10-24T14:10:03.722Z","severity":{"score":7.8,"label":"High","version":"3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","source":"Linux"},"assigner":"Linux","products":["Linux Linux"],"affected":[{"vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"2e1743085887ba3f553c2bb472a75a3ff744b242","status":"affected","lessThan":"2e5c80bbc062a8dda33e687ebf7be8f074ee4f7d","versionType":"git"},{"version":"2e1743085887ba3f553c2bb472a75a3ff744b242","status":"affected","lessThan":"8e48d8d51ab37b7decfbff3e2844e027a52ad6ea","versionType":"git"},{"version":"2e1743085887ba3f553c2bb472a75a3ff744b242","status":"affected","lessThan":"405290be962b32eec842776fbe3bdf81f15b1676","versionType":"git"}],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["arch/riscv/include/asm/futex.h"]},{"vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","defaultStatus":"affected","versions":[{"version":"6.13","status":"affected"},{"version":"0","status":"unaffected","lessThan":"6.13","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.18.57","status":"unaffected","lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.2.11","status":"unaffected","lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.3","status":"unaffected","lessThanOrEqual":"*","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["arch/riscv/include/asm/futex.h"]}],"references":["https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e5c80bbc062a8dda33e687ebf7be8f074ee4f7d","https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e48d8d51ab37b7decfbff3e2844e027a52ad6ea","https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/405290be962b32eec842776fbe3bdf81f15b1676"],"weaknesses":[],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-29T20:13:43.249Z","source":{"repository":"CVEProject/cvelistV5","path":"cves/2026/99xxx/CVE-2026-99016.json","commit":"556c9d3a8cd17e218bb8e452ba7cd619a384ff47"},"raw":{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-99016","state":"PUBLISHED","datePublished":"2026-10-23T12:20:47.859Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-24T14:10:03.722Z","assignerShortName":"Linux","assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","dateReserved":"2026-09-25T10:25:14.386Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"riscv: futex: untag the user pointer before the atomic access","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv: futex: untag the user pointer before the atomic access\n\naccess_ok() checks untagged_addr(uaddr), but arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser()\nand futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() hand the raw uaddr to the inline asm\namoswap/amoadd/.../lr.w+sc.w through the \"+m\" (*uaddr) operand.  When the\ntagged address ABI is enabled (CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SUPM, prctl\nPR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL with PMLEN != 0), those two addresses differ: a\nuser pointer whose top PMLEN bits hold a tag passes access_ok() after\nuntagging, but the atomic is then performed on the still-tagged raw\naddress.\n\nSupervisor-mode data accesses are not subject to the U-mode pointer\nmasking (that is governed by menvcfg.PMM, which the kernel does not set),\nso hardware does not strip the tag for the kernel's own access.  With\nSv57 and PMLEN=16 the tag bits overlap the canonical-address bits, so a\ntagged pointer can name a canonical kernel virtual address (e.g. in the\nlinear map) whose untagged form is a valid user address.  An unprivileged\nprocess can thus make FUTEX_WAKE_OP perform an atomic read-modify-write on\nan arbitrary kernel address, with the matching FUTEX_OP_CMP_* result\nserving as a read oracle.\n\nget_user()/put_user()/raw_copy_{to,from}_user() already untag the pointer\nafter the access_ok() check; do the same in the futex helpers so the\natomic operates on the address that was actually validated."}],"affected":[{"vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"2e1743085887ba3f553c2bb472a75a3ff744b242","status":"affected","lessThan":"2e5c80bbc062a8dda33e687ebf7be8f074ee4f7d","versionType":"git"},{"version":"2e1743085887ba3f553c2bb472a75a3ff744b242","status":"affected","lessThan":"8e48d8d51ab37b7decfbff3e2844e027a52ad6ea","versionType":"git"},{"version":"2e1743085887ba3f553c2bb472a75a3ff744b242","status":"affected","lessThan":"405290be962b32eec842776fbe3bdf81f15b1676","versionType":"git"}],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["arch/riscv/include/asm/futex.h"]},{"vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","defaultStatus":"affected","versions":[{"version":"6.13","status":"affected"},{"version":"0","status":"unaffected","lessThan":"6.13","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.18.57","status":"unaffected","lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.2.11","status":"unaffected","lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.3","status":"unaffected","lessThanOrEqual":"*","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["arch/riscv/include/asm/futex.h"]}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e5c80bbc062a8dda33e687ebf7be8f074ee4f7d"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e48d8d51ab37b7decfbff3e2844e027a52ad6ea"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/405290be962b32eec842776fbe3bdf81f15b1676"}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - `sys_futex(FUTEX_WAKE_OP_PRIVATE)` follows `do_futex()` → `futex_wake_op()` → `futex_atomic_op_inuser()` → the patched `arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser()` using attacker-supplied `uaddr2`; no network data reaches this local syscall path.\nAC:L - On an affected Sv57 system supporting PMLEN=16, the attacker deterministically enables tagged addresses with `prctl()` and supplies a canonical linear-map pointer; no race, victim state, or second actor is required.\nPR:L - `sys_prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL)` and `sys_futex()` contain no capability or credential checks, so an ordinary unprivileged process can enable PMLEN=16 and invoke `FUTEX_WAKE_OP_PRIVATE`.\nUI:N - The attacking process performs both `prctl()` setup and the futex operations itself; no victim must open, mount, approve, or otherwise act.\nS:U - The AMO instructions corrupt the host kernel's own linear-map memory, producing ordinary local kernel privilege escalation without crossing a VM, IOMMU, or separate security authority.\nC:H - The raw-address AMO returns the prior 32-bit kernel value to `futex_atomic_op_inuser()`, whose `FUTEX_OP_CMP_*` result can be observed through controlled waiters, providing a repeatable read oracle over direct-mapped physical memory.\nI:H - `arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser()` executes `amoswap`, `amoadd`, `amoor`, `amoand`, or `amoxor` at the chosen kernel address; SET followed by shifted OR operations permits controlled 32-bit kernel-memory writes and privilege escalation.\nA:H - The same chosen-address AMOs can overwrite direct-mapped kernel objects, credentials, or page-table memory; corrupting such live kernel state can reliably cause an oops, panic, or complete system failure."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"Linux","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","dateUpdated":"2026-10-24T14:10:03.722Z"},"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.13","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.57"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.13","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.11"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.13","versionEndExcluding":"7.3"}]}]}],"x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}}}}