{"id":"CVE-2026-48088","state":"PUBLISHED","title":"OpenReception vulnerable to unauthenticated staff crypto poisoning that breaks E2E recipient directory","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the route `POST /api/tenants/{tenantId}/staff/{staffId}/crypto` accepts and stores attacker-controlled ML-KEM-768 public keys against any tenant on the platform without authentication. The handler logs an \"Unauthorized crypto key storage attempt\" warning when neither a session nor a registration cookie is present, then proceeds to insert the row regardless. The platform's E2E claim that \"even administrators cannot view sensitive information\" is broken: any unauthenticated network attacker can register themselves as an additional encryption recipient for any tenant's future patient appointments. A second variant of the bug suppresses the unauthorized-warning log entry. The Zod schema makes the `email` field optional. When the request body omits `email` and the request carries no registration cookie, the comparison `registrationEmail === email` becomes `undefined === undefined`, which evaluates to `true`. The handler treats the request as a legitimate registration flow, skips the warning entirely, and stores the row. Successful storage is still recorded as an `[info]` log line, but the security-relevant warning that operators are most likely to monitor or alert on is gone. The `staff_crypto` table has no unique constraint on `user_id`, so an arbitrary number of attacker rows can coexist for the same staff identifier and all return as `is_active=true`. The supplied `staffId` does not need to match any existing user or pending invite. Schema validation on `passkeyId`, `publicKey`, and `privateKeyShare` is also weak: the literal string `<placeholder-base64>` was accepted, indicating no length, format, or cryptographic-validity check beyond field presence. This weakness is independent of the auth bypass but compounds it: a poisoned directory can also be filled with malformed entries that break legitimate booking flows. The injected key is consumed by the public booking flow. After completing the unauthenticated `bootstrap-challenge` and `bootstrap-verify` ceremony as a \"patient\", the resulting `bookingAccessToken` is accepted by `GET /api/tenants/{id}/appointments/staff-public-keys`, which returns the attacker-controlled keys alongside any legitimate ones. A new appointment encrypts its tunnel key with ML-KEM to all listed recipients, so the attacker becomes a co-recipient of the encryption and can decapsulate the tunnel key with the matching secret. From there, all appointment payloads for that booking are decryptable. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue.","publishedAt":"2026-08-06T21:34:32.016Z","updatedAt":"2026-08-08T02:47:46.506Z","severity":{"score":9.4,"label":"Critical","version":"3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","source":"GitHub_M"},"assigner":"GitHub_M","products":["open-reception appointment-booking-software"],"affected":[{"vendor":"open-reception","product":"appointment-booking-software","versions":[{"version":"< 1.0.4","status":"affected"}]}],"references":["https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-pch3-hcmf-cjw4","https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/78dfd9317a0be0897e6e4d73afe670c07a75460f"],"weaknesses":["CWE-862"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-29T20:12:07.131Z","source":{"repository":"CVEProject/cvelistV5","path":"cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48088.json","commit":"556c9d3a8cd17e218bb8e452ba7cd619a384ff47"},"raw":{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-48088","state":"PUBLISHED","datePublished":"2026-08-06T21:34:32.016Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-08T02:47:46.506Z","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateReserved":"2026-05-20T18:40:45.833Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"OpenReception vulnerable to unauthenticated staff crypto poisoning that breaks E2E recipient directory","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the route `POST /api/tenants/{tenantId}/staff/{staffId}/crypto` accepts and stores attacker-controlled ML-KEM-768 public keys against any tenant on the platform without authentication. The handler logs an \"Unauthorized crypto key storage attempt\" warning when neither a session nor a registration cookie is present, then proceeds to insert the row regardless. The platform's E2E claim that \"even administrators cannot view sensitive information\" is broken: any unauthenticated network attacker can register themselves as an additional encryption recipient for any tenant's future patient appointments. A second variant of the bug suppresses the unauthorized-warning log entry. The Zod schema makes the `email` field optional. When the request body omits `email` and the request carries no registration cookie, the comparison `registrationEmail === email` becomes `undefined === undefined`, which evaluates to `true`. The handler treats the request as a legitimate registration flow, skips the warning entirely, and stores the row. Successful storage is still recorded as an `[info]` log line, but the security-relevant warning that operators are most likely to monitor or alert on is gone. The `staff_crypto` table has no unique constraint on `user_id`, so an arbitrary number of attacker rows can coexist for the same staff identifier and all return as `is_active=true`. The supplied `staffId` does not need to match any existing user or pending invite. Schema validation on `passkeyId`, `publicKey`, and `privateKeyShare` is also weak: the literal string `<placeholder-base64>` was accepted, indicating no length, format, or cryptographic-validity check beyond field presence. This weakness is independent of the auth bypass but compounds it: a poisoned directory can also be filled with malformed entries that break legitimate booking flows. The injected key is consumed by the public booking flow. After completing the unauthenticated `bootstrap-challenge` and `bootstrap-verify` ceremony as a \"patient\", the resulting `bookingAccessToken` is accepted by `GET /api/tenants/{id}/appointments/staff-public-keys`, which returns the attacker-controlled keys alongside any legitimate ones. A new appointment encrypts its tunnel key with ML-KEM to all listed recipients, so the attacker becomes a co-recipient of the encryption and can decapsulate the tunnel key with the matching secret. From there, all appointment payloads for that booking are decryptable. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue."}],"affected":[{"vendor":"open-reception","product":"appointment-booking-software","versions":[{"version":"< 1.0.4","status":"affected"}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-pch3-hcmf-cjw4","name":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-pch3-hcmf-cjw4","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/78dfd9317a0be0897e6e4d73afe670c07a75460f","name":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/78dfd9317a0be0897e6e4d73afe670c07a75460f","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"LOW","baseScore":9.4,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-862","lang":"en","description":"CWE-862: Missing Authorization","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"GitHub_M","orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateUpdated":"2026-08-06T21:34:32.016Z"},"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-pch3-hcmf-cjw4","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-pch3-hcmf-cjw4","tags":["exploit"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-08-08T02:47:21.298201Z","id":"CVE-2026-48088","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"CISA-ADP","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","dateUpdated":"2026-08-08T02:47:46.506Z"}}]}}}