{"id":"CVE-2026-48086","state":"PUBLISHED","title":"OpenReception: Tenant admin self-promotes to GLOBAL_ADMIN","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that \"only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN\", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.","publishedAt":"2026-08-06T21:30:32.142Z","updatedAt":"2026-08-07T14:36:39.807Z","severity":{"score":9.9,"label":"Critical","version":"3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","source":"GitHub_M"},"assigner":"GitHub_M","products":["open-reception appointment-booking-software"],"affected":[{"vendor":"open-reception","product":"appointment-booking-software","versions":[{"version":"< 1.0.2","status":"affected"}]}],"references":["https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469","https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494"],"weaknesses":["CWE-269"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-29T20:12:07.131Z","source":{"repository":"CVEProject/cvelistV5","path":"cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48086.json","commit":"556c9d3a8cd17e218bb8e452ba7cd619a384ff47"},"raw":{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-48086","state":"PUBLISHED","datePublished":"2026-08-06T21:30:32.142Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-07T14:36:39.807Z","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateReserved":"2026-05-20T18:40:45.833Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"OpenReception: Tenant admin self-promotes to GLOBAL_ADMIN","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that \"only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN\", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue."}],"affected":[{"vendor":"open-reception","product":"appointment-booking-software","versions":[{"version":"< 1.0.2","status":"affected"}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469","name":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494","name":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":9.9,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-269","lang":"en","description":"CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"GitHub_M","orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateUpdated":"2026-08-06T21:30:32.142Z"},"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469","tags":["exploit"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-08-07T14:36:33.558143Z","id":"CVE-2026-48086","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"CISA-ADP","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","dateUpdated":"2026-08-07T14:36:39.807Z"}}]}}}