{"id":"CVE-2026-19576","state":"PUBLISHED","title":"Stack out-of-bounds write in the Goodix GT911 touch controller driver from an unvalidated device-reported touch point count","description":"The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured.\n\nEach loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte.\n\nThe impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing.","publishedAt":"2026-10-11T17:14:53.339Z","updatedAt":"2026-10-15T18:09:27.588Z","severity":{"score":6.8,"label":"Medium","version":"3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","source":"zephyr"},"assigner":"zephyr","products":["zephyrproject zephyr"],"affected":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","packageName":"zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"4.0.0","status":"affected","lessThanOrEqual":"4.4.2","versionType":"semver"}],"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/input/input_gt911.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"gt911_process"}]}],"references":["https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/42b52d571eb2113012c135276693042fd372fdea","https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr"],"weaknesses":["CWE-787"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-29T20:11:10.572Z","source":{"repository":"CVEProject/cvelistV5","path":"cves/2026/19xxx/CVE-2026-19576.json","commit":"556c9d3a8cd17e218bb8e452ba7cd619a384ff47"},"raw":{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-19576","state":"PUBLISHED","datePublished":"2026-10-11T17:14:53.339Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-15T18:09:27.588Z","assignerShortName":"zephyr","assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","dateReserved":"2026-08-11T19:56:48.396Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"Stack out-of-bounds write in the Goodix GT911 touch controller driver from an unvalidated device-reported touch point count","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured.\n\nEach loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte.\n\nThe impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing."}],"affected":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","packageName":"zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"4.0.0","status":"affected","lessThanOrEqual":"4.4.2","versionType":"semver"}],"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/input/input_gt911.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"gt911_process"}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/42b52d571eb2113012c135276693042fd372fdea","name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr","name":"GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr"}],"metrics":[{"format":"CVSS","cvssV3_1":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":6.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-787","lang":"en","description":"bounds","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"zephyr","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","dateUpdated":"2026-10-11T17:14:53.339Z"},"x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}},"adp":[{"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-10-15T17:57:40.802963Z","id":"CVE-2026-19576","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"CISA-ADP","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","dateUpdated":"2026-10-15T18:09:27.588Z"}}]}}}