{"id":"CVE-2026-115477","state":"PUBLISHED","title":"obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP","description":"obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.","publishedAt":"2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z","updatedAt":"2026-10-29T17:50:19.455Z","severity":{"score":7.1,"label":"High","version":"4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","source":"GitHub_M"},"assigner":"GitHub_M","products":["The-40-Thieves obsidian-tc"],"affected":[{"vendor":"The-40-Thieves","product":"obsidian-tc","versions":[{"version":">= 1.13.0, < 1.31.4","status":"affected"}]}],"references":["https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc","https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967","https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969","https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71","https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md","https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"],"weaknesses":["CWE-285","CWE-863"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-29T20:10:43.281Z","source":{"repository":"CVEProject/cvelistV5","path":"cves/2026/115xxx/CVE-2026-115477.json","commit":"556c9d3a8cd17e218bb8e452ba7cd619a384ff47"},"raw":{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-115477","state":"PUBLISHED","datePublished":"2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-29T17:50:19.455Z","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateReserved":"2026-10-22T15:06:52.738Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."}],"affected":[{"vendor":"The-40-Thieves","product":"obsidian-tc","versions":[{"version":">= 1.13.0, < 1.31.4","status":"affected"}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc","name":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"]},{"url":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967","name":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]},{"url":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969","name":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]},{"url":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71","name":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]},{"url":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md","name":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]},{"url":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4","name":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"LOW","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":7.1,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-285","lang":"en","description":"CWE-285: Improper Authorization","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-863","lang":"en","description":"CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"GitHub_M","orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateUpdated":"2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z"},"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967","tags":["exploit"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-10-29T17:49:54.670297Z","id":"CVE-2026-115477","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"CISA-ADP","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","dateUpdated":"2026-10-29T17:50:19.455Z"}}]}}}