{"id":"CVE-2026-114611","state":"PUBLISHED","title":"OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack","description":"OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.","publishedAt":"2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z","updatedAt":"2026-10-29T02:23:10.004Z","severity":{"score":9.1,"label":"Critical","version":"3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","source":"GitHub_M"},"assigner":"GitHub_M","products":["schorschii OCO-Server"],"affected":[{"vendor":"schorschii","product":"OCO-Server","versions":[{"version":"< 1.2.3","status":"affected"}]}],"references":["https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404","https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df"],"weaknesses":["CWE-295"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-29T20:10:43.281Z","source":{"repository":"CVEProject/cvelistV5","path":"cves/2026/114xxx/CVE-2026-114611.json","commit":"556c9d3a8cd17e218bb8e452ba7cd619a384ff47"},"raw":{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-114611","state":"PUBLISHED","datePublished":"2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-29T02:23:10.004Z","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateReserved":"2026-10-21T20:34:25.599Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue."}],"affected":[{"vendor":"schorschii","product":"OCO-Server","versions":[{"version":"< 1.2.3","status":"affected"}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"]},{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404","name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]},{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df","name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":9.1,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-295","lang":"en","description":"CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"GitHub_M","orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","dateUpdated":"2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z"},"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","tags":["exploit"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-10-29T02:22:49.207174Z","id":"CVE-2026-114611","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"providerMetadata":{"shortName":"CISA-ADP","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","dateUpdated":"2026-10-29T02:23:10.004Z"}}]}}}